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Abstract
We propose a dynamic model of dependence structure between financial institutions within
a financial system and we construct measures for dependence and financial instability. Employ-
ing Markov structures of joint credit migrations, our model allows for contagious simultaneous
jumps in credit ratings and provides flexibility in modeling dependence structures. Another
key aspect is that the proposed measures consider the interdependence and reflect the changing
economic landscape as financial institutions evolve over time. In the final part, we give several
examples, where we study various dependence structures and investigate their systemic insta-
bility measures. In particular, we show that subject to the same pool of Markov chains, the
simulated Markov structures with distinct dependence structures generate different sequences
of systemic instability.
Keywords: Contagion; dependence structure; systemic risk; systemic dependence measure;
systemic instability measure; systemic importance; Markov structures.
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1 Introduction
The most recent global financial crisis has highlighted interconnectedness in the financial system
as a crucial source of systemic risk. In the 1990s, the concept of modeling systemic risk focused
on the too-big-to-fail issue, whereas the recent financial crisis addresses the too-connected-to-fail
problem. Since financial institutions are linked by financial activities, the default of one systemically
important financial institution may jeopardize the stability of other financial counterparties. This
may lead to successive rounds of failures, where the default of one financial institution escalates
the financial distress of other engaged institutions. Under adverse circumstances, the distress may
propagate through the whole financial system and cause the collapse of the financial system. On
the other hand, a default of a “bad player” in a financial system may lead to improved health of the
surviving part of the system. Such a phenomenon can be justifiably termed as “systemic benefit”.
We believe this financial phenomenon is highly related to the dependence structure within a
financial system, namely, the interdependence between financial institutions. It is well recognized
that understanding how the dependence structure will influence the financial stability of a financial
system remains one of the key challenges faced by the market participants today.
The literature regarding various aspects of modeling systemic risk, in particular the network
models, has been rapidly growing in the recent years. We refer the reader to some recent studies,
e.g., [AM12, BC15, CCVW14, EN01, FL13, GY15, Sum13] and the references therein.
The main objective of this paper is to develop a novel methodology to study the dependence
structure between financial institutions and the financial stability of the system, in a dynamic
framework, and to test it via a numerical study. In particular, we propose new measures for
computing the levels of dependence and financial instability of a financial economy. These measures
account for credit migrations of the financial institutions and the stochastic dependence between
these migrations, which is modeled in terms of Markov structures.
The concept of Markov structures1 for multivariate Markov processes was originated in Bielecki
et al. [BVV08]. A Markov structure for a collection of Markov chains is a multivariate Markov
chain whose components are Markov chains with identical probability laws to the prescribed Markov
chains. In [BJVV08], the authors have successfully applied the Markov structures theory to financial
markets, in particular, to the basket-type products in credit risk. Among others, Cre´pey et al.
1In the previous works, a Markov structure was called a Markov coupla.
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[CJZ09] study the counterparty risk on a payer CDS based on a Markov structures approach;
Bielecki et al. [BCF18] use a Markov structures model to investigate the dependence structure
between the Central Clearing Parties. Whereas, these works confine their numerical studies to
the strong Markov structures (cf. Definitions 2.4 and Definition 2.5 for weak Markov structures).
Typically, for a strong Markov structure there is no contagious impact between the components
while the Markovian components changing their states. In a nutshell, our proposed methodology is
not restricted to the strong Markov structures. Another important aspect of the numerical study is
to present the possibilities and accommodate the needs in modeling from the practical viewpoints.
Toward this end, we consider a financial economy consisting of finite numbers of financial insti-
tutions, where financial institutions are assigned credit migrating processes to reflect their financial
stability. We assume that these individual credit migration processes are Markov chains. Next, we
introduce a joint credit migration process whose components have the same probability laws as these
individual credit migration processes, respectively. This joint credit migration process contains full
information about the stochastic dependence between individual migrations. We propose to model
this joint migration process as a Markov structure. Since the infinitesimal generator of a Markov
structure encodes the dependence structure between these migrations, each Markov structure will
characterize the evolution of dependence structure between the individual institutions.
Furthermore, in an interconnected financial system, the migration of financial stability for one
financial institution has direct or indirect impacts on the other financial institutions. Generally
speaking, the phenomenon in which a shock from one financial institution is transmitted to another
financial institution is called contagion2. In our framework, this transmission mechanism can be
introduced by imposing conditions on the generator of the Markov structure. That is, we consider
weak-only Markov structures to model the joint credit migration process such that the credit
migrations of some financial institutions are allowed to affect other credit migrations.
Now, we shift our attention to measuring systemic risk and systemic stability. In literature,
there are various perspectives on systemic measures, or what general properties a systemic measure
needs to preserve. For instance, [APPR12, BFFMB15, BFLV12, CIM13, FRW17, Gig11, HMBS16,
SE17, SG09], and the reference therein.
Here we propose three measures to compute systemic risk, stochastic dependence between the
financial institutions within a financial system, as well as systemic instability of this system. Let
us start with the systemic risk measure. Suppose that a multivariate Markov chain X taking finite
values in E is endowed with dependence structure D between its components; to emphasize this,
we will use the notation XD = (XD,1 . . . ,XD,m). Let f be a real valued integrable function. We
are interested in the conditional probabilities of of the form
P
(
f
(
XDT
)
∈ B | XDt = x
)
, x ∈ E, 0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞, (1.1)
where B is a Borel set. We would like to compute the conditional probability of a fixed number
of financial institutions that will be in certain credit ratings at some future time. This concept
2In literature, there are serious debates on the definitions of contagion and spillovers. These definitions are
model-dependent. Here, instead of giving precise definitions, we want to introduce the concept of the financial chain
reactions.
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of measuring systemic risk is common in the financial literature. For instance, proposing the
joint default probability for a systemic event. However, we argue that, using only the probability of
systemic default events without considering the dependence structure between financial institutions
is not thorough. It may happen that a financial system endowed with distinct dependence structures
produces the same level of the joint default probability at some time t. We believe that the
dependence structure is at the core of studying systemic risk and should be taken into account.
To account for the impact of dependence structure, we propose a systemic dependence measure
of the form,
P
(
f
(
XDT
)
∈ B | XDt = x
)
− P
(
f
(
XIT
)
∈ B | XIt = x
)
, x ∈ E, 0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞, (1.2)
where I stands for the independence structure. Namely, we normalize the systemic risk measure
through the independence structure (cf. Definition 4.2). Under the Markov structures framework,
since the Markov structures XD and XI are subject to the same pool of Markov chains, the
normalization of (1.2) has solid grounds.
Additionally, we extend the systemic dependence measure to systemic instability measure to
highlight the distance between distributions of XDt and X
I
t (cf. Definition 4.4). Not only does the
systemic instability measure include the ingredients of joint default probability and dependence,
but it also allows us to track systemic instability for a fixed monitor window on a regular basis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and briefly re-
call related results to lay the foundations for our work. In Section 2.1 we set forth the concept
of Markovian consistency, which concerns the Markov property of components of a multivariate
Markov chain in different filtrations. The Markovian consistency theory plays a crucial role in the
Markov structures theory. Next, we introduce Markov structures in Section 2.2, and provide a
continuous time algorithm to solve for weak-only Markov structures. Section 3 is dedicated to a
dynamic framework of modeling stochastic dependence between financial institutions. We explain
the concept of dependence and the meaning of contagion in the context of a Markov structures
model. Besides, a discrete-time algorithm for constructing weak-only Markov structures is pro-
vided. Right after the algorithm, a short discussion about the calibration of dependence structure
is presented. In Section 4, we construct systemic risk measure, systemic dependence measure, and
systemic instability measure as a gateway to the abstract concepts of dependence and financial sta-
bility. We explain financial meanings and examine the mathematical properties for the measures:
invariant with respect to the permutation of the financial institutions and law-invariant. Finally,
comprehensive numerical examples are given in Section 5, where we provide various dependence
structures and describe how to adopt this framework to monitor financial stability. For convenience,
we defer to Appendix A some technical results related to this paper.
2 Preliminaries
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete underlying probability space. We consider a finite time horizon.
Throughout this paper, for any process Y defined on (Ω,F ,P), we denote by FY = (FYt , t ≥ 0)
the natural filtration of Y , FYt = σ{Yu, 0 ≤ u ≤ t}, and denote by µ
Y the initial distribution
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of Y . We fix a positive integer m, and consider a collection of finite sets Ei, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Next, let E = E1 × E2 × · · · × Em be the Cartesian product. The elements of E are denoted by
z =
(
z1, . . . , zm
)
.
We consider a continuous time multivariate Markov chain X =
(
X1, . . . ,Xm
)
defined on
(Ω,F ,P) taking values in E. Thus, it holds that
P
(
Xt+u ∈ Γ | F
X
t
)
= P (Xt+u ∈ Γ | Xt) , t, u ≥ 0, Γ ⊂ E. (2.1)
Equivalently, the Markov property (2.1) can be written as
P
(
Xtn+1 = xn+1 | Xtn = xn, Xtn−1 = xn−1, . . . , X0 = x0
)
= P
(
Xtn+1 = xn+1 | Xtn = xn
)
, (2.2)
for every n ∈ N, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ tn ≤ tn+1 and xj ∈ E, j = 0, 1, . . . , n + 1, and whenever the
conditional probabilities on the both sides are well-defined.
The transition probability function of X is denoted by Pt,s =
[
Px,yt,s
]
x,y∈E
, 0 ≤ t ≤ s < ∞,
namely, Px,yt,s = P(Xs = y | Xt = x). We assume that for every t ≥ 0 the following limit exists
outside of a set of Lebesgue zero,
Λt := lim
h↓0
Pt,t+h − I|E|×|E|
h
, (2.3)
where I|E|×|E| is the identity matrix of dimension |E|-by-|E|, with |E| the cardinality of set E. On
the set of Lebesgue zero we take Λt = 0. The matrix function Λt := [λ
x,y
t ] , 0 ≤ t < ∞, defined in
(2.3) is called the infinitesimal generator function of X. Followed by (2.3), for all x, y ∈ E, entry
λ
x,y
t ≥ 0 for x 6= y, λ
x,x
t ≤ 0, and ∑
y∈E
λ
x,y
t = 0.
We will also postulate measurability and some mild integrable properties about Λt, 0 ≤ t < ∞.
Therefore, the Kolmogorov forward equations are satisfied, in particular, in matrix notation,
∂
∂s
Pt,s = Pt,sΛs, Pt,t = I|E|×|E|.
2.1 Markovian consistency
From here on, we sharpen our focus to two definitions of Markovian consistency in the context of
the multivariate Markov chain X. Moreover, we collect some relevant concepts and results from
[BJN13, Cha17] to lay the basis for our work.
Definition 2.1 (Strong Markovian consistency, [BJN13, Definition 1.2]). A multivariate Markov
chain X is strongly Markovian consistent relative to the component Xi if
P
(
Xis ∈ Γ
i | FXt
)
= P
(
Xis ∈ Γ
i | Xit
)
, (2.4)
for every Γi ⊂ Ei, 0 ≤ t ≤ s < ∞. If (2.4) holds for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, then we say that X
satisfies the strong Markovian consistency property, or that X is strongly Markovian consistent.
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Next concept is weaker than strong Markovian consistency.
Definition 2.2 (Weak Markovian consistency, [BJN13, Definition 1.1]). A multivariate Markov
chain X is weakly Markovian consistent relative to the component Xi if
P
(
Xis ∈ Γ
i | FX
i
t
)
= P
(
Xis ∈ Γ
i | Xit
)
, (2.5)
for every Γi ⊂ Ei, 0 ≤ t ≤ s < ∞. If (2.5) holds for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, then we say that X
satisfies the weak Markovian consistency property, or that X is weakly Markovian consistent.
If a multivariate Markov chain is weakly Markovian consistent, but not strongly Markovian
consistent, we say that this multivariate Markov chain satisfies the weak-only Markovian consistency
property.
Definition 2.3. For any i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and t ≥ 0 the operator Θit acting on any function g : E → R
is defined as
Θitg
(
xi
)
= EP
(
g (Xt) | X
i
t = x
i
)
, xi ∈ Ei.
For any i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, the extension operator Φi acting on any function f : Ei → R is defined by
Φif (x) = f
(
xi
)
, x =
(
x1, x2, . . . , xm
)
∈ E.
In view of [BJN13, Theorem 1.11], if X is weakly Markovian consistent relative to Xi, then the
generator matrix function of Xi, say Λit, is given as
Λit = Θ
i
tΛtΦ
i, t ≥ 0. (2.6)
However, the converse of the above statement is not true in general. In Appendix A, we summarize
verifiable sufficient conditions for the converse implications and several results from [Cha17]. These
results will be used later on the construction of Markov structures.
2.2 Markov structures
The Markov structures theory studies the stochastic dependence between the components of a
multivariate Markov process, subject to marginal constraints on the coordinate processes. In the
sequel, based on [BJN13] we embark on defining Markov structures in terms of infinitesimal gen-
erators. In analogy to strong and weak Markovian consistency, we have strong Markov structures
and weak Markov structures.
Definition 2.4 (Strong Markov structure). Let {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m} be a collection of Markov chains.
A multivariate process X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xm) is a strong Markov structure for {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m},
if
(i) X is a Markov chain, and X satisfies the strong Markovian consistency property;
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(ii) each component Xi of X has the same law as Y i, Xi
L
= Y i3, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The counterpart of the strong Markov structure is the weak Markov structure.
Definition 2.5 (Weak Markov structure). Let {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m} be a collection of Markov chains.
A multivariate process X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xm) is a weak Markov structure for {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}, if
(i) X is a Markov chain, and X satisfies the weak Markovian consistency property;
(ii) each component Xi of X has the same law as Y i, Xi
L
= Y i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
We say that a multivariate process X is a weak-only Markov structure for {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}, if
X is a weak Markov structure, but it is not a strong Markov structure. Because modeling default
contagion is excluded in the sense of strong Markov consistency (cf. [BCCH14, BJN13]), in practice,
the weak-only Markov structure is an important class.
One question arising naturally in the Markov structures theory is the construction of Markov
structures. In view of [BJVV08, Proposition 5.1], since condition (M) implies strong Markovian
consistency, the construction of strong Markov structures is fully understood. Besides, we can
construct infinitely many strong Markov structures for a collection of Markov chains. Detailed
construction can be found in [BJN13].
In the case of weak or weak-only Markov structures, the construction can be done by Theorem
A.3 and Theorem A.5. In view of Theorem A.3, the sufficient condition for the weak Markovian
consistency intertwines the semigroups of X and Y i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Since the semigroup of a
time-inhomogeneous Markov chain is a functional of its infinitesimal generator, it turns out the
construction of weak or weak-only Markov structures is not an easy task. We end this section by
providing a continuous time algorithm for constructing weak-only Markov structures. We defer the
practical viewpoint of the discrete time algorithm to Section 3.3.
Algorithm I (Weak-only Markov structures: continuous time)
Input: let the initial distribution µX ofX and the valid generators
(
Λiu, u ≥ 0
)
of Y i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
be given.
Step 1. Solve for a valid infinitesimal generator (Λu, u ≥ 0) of X, without satisfying condition (M),
such that
ΘitPt,s = P̂
i
t,sΘ
i
s, 0 ≤ t ≤ s, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (2.7)
where P̂it,s is the semigroup of
(
Λiu, u ≥ 0
)
. Then we obtain weak Markov structures.
Step 2. If the following condition is satisfied,
P
(
Xt =
(
x1, x2, . . . , xm
))
> 0, dt -a. e.,
(
x1, x2, . . . , xm
)
∈ E, (2.8)
3The symbol
L
= means equality in law. In the case of classical Markov chains, the initial distribution and the
transition semigroup of the chain characterize the finite-dimensional distributions of the chain. Therefore, they
characterize the law of the chain.
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then we have the weak-only Markov structures and end the algorithm.
If the condition (2.8) is not satisfied, then we verify whether or not strong Markovian
consistency property holds. If, indeed, the strong Markovian consistency does not hold,
then we have the weak-only Markov structures and end the algorithm. Otherwise, we have
the weak Markov structures.
Note that for fixed 0 ≤ t ≤ s, (2.7) is an underdetermined homogeneous system. Moreover, the
condition in Theorem A.3 is sufficient, the unavailability of the solution in the Step 1 of Algorithm
I does not imply the nonexistence of the weak Markov structure.
3 Modeling dependence structure
We consider a financial system consisting of m financial institutions on a fixed finite time horizon
T > 0. We denote by M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Without loss of generality, we categorize the corporate
credit rating scales to a finite state space K = {0, 1, . . . ,K}. By convention, the state K is the
default state. Suppose that Y i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, are Markov chains taking values in K. The
process Y i represents the evolution of credit ratings of the ith financial institution which carries
idiosyncratic risk. The natural filtration of Y i can be seen as the relevant information on financial
stability. We also assume that Y i has infinitesimal generator Λit = [λ
i;xi,yi
t ]xi,yi∈K, t ≥ 0, i =
1, 2, . . . ,m, where the function λi;x
i,yi
t measures the transition rate of Y
i from rating xi to rating yi
at time t. The transition probability function of Y i is denoted by P̂it,s =
[
P̂i;x
i,yi
t,s
]
xi,yi∈K
, 0 ≤ t ≤ s,
where P̂i;x
i,yi
t,s represents the probability of Y
i migrating to rating yi at time s conditional on being
in rating xi at time t.
Remark 3.1. Throughout, we assume that the marginal laws of individual credit migrating process
Y i is known or estimated from market data. For instance, rating agencies provide transition
matrices of credit ratings for financial institutions. Alternatively, many methodologies have been
proposed to estimate credit rating transition matrices in literature.
Next, let a continuous time multivariate Markov chain X =
(
X1,X2, . . . ,Xm
)
take values
in Km = K × · · · × K with initial distribution µX . The chain X represents the joint credit mi-
gration process of these m financial institutions. More specifically, given a pool of credit migra-
tion processes {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}, we would like to construct the infinitesimal generator matrix
Λt = [λ
x,y
t ]x,y∈Km , t ≥ 0 of X, such that X is a Markov structure for {Y
1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}. It follows
that every component Xi of X is Markovian; necessarily, Xi has the same probability law as Y i,
ΘitΛtΦ
i = Λit, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (3.1)
As already mentioned, there always exist nontrivial Markov structures. The generator (Λt, t ≥ 0)
of a Markov structure is embedded with distinct algebraic structure between its components which
are subject to the identical probability laws of the credit migration processes, respectively. Saying
differently, the algebraic structure of every generator encodes the dependence structure between
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these components. We use the Markov structure as a proxy to the dependence structure of m
financial institutions.
In the sequel, we dive in the details of dependence in the context of the Markov structures
model.
3.1 Independence in terms of the generator of X
We first introduce two notations. Let I be the identity matrix of dimension |K|. The mth tensor
power (or the Kronecker product) of I is the m-fold tensor product of I,
I⊗m := I⊗ · · · ⊗ I︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
.
The notation I⊗m,jA is reserved for replacing the jth matrix I by some matrix A whose dimension
is the same as I,
I⊗m,jA := I⊗ · · · ⊗
jth︷︸︸︷
A ⊗ · · · ⊗ I︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
.
An important result in [BJN17, Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2] shows that, if the semigroup
of X is the tensor product of the semigroups from the components, then the components of X
are conditional independent given FT . We apply this result here and by the fact that condition
(P) is equivalent to condition (M). We can show that if the infinitesimal generator of X is the
tensor product of the infinitesimal generators from the components, then the components of X are
independent. We now formally give the definition of independence between the components of X
by means of the infinitesimal generator of X.
Definition 3.2 (Independence). Let (Λt, t ≥ 0) be a valid infinitesimal generator matrix function
of X. We say that the components of X are independent if Λt admits the representation,
Λt =
m∑
j=1
I⊗m,j
A
j
t
=
m∑
j=1
I⊗ · · · ⊗
jth︷︸︸︷
A
j
t ⊗ · · · ⊗ I︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, t ≥ 0, (3.2)
where Ajt , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, is a valid generator matrix function with the same dimension as I.
Note that an infinitesimal generator given by (3.2) satisfies condition (M), which can be verified
by computing
ΛtΦ
i, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Therefore, a multivariate Markov chain having generator (3.2) is a strong Markov structure for a
collection of Markov chains generated by
(
Ait, t ≥ 0
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, respectively.
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3.2 Contagion
As stated in Section 2.2, we can construct infinitely many strong Markov structures by condition
(M). However, a strong Markov structure satisfying condition (M) has some undesirable properties
in terms of risk management. In this section, we start by giving an example to explain the financial
interpretations behind these properties. Meanwhile, we use this example to give intuitions about
the meaning of contagion in our framework, and to elucidate how the strong Markov structure
excludes contagion.
Example 3.3. Consider a joint credit migration process X =
(
X1,X2
)
generated by (Λt, t ≥ 0),
Λt =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −(at + ct + dt) dt at ct
(0,1) ft −(at + ft) 0 at
(1,0) bt 0 −(bt + dt) dt
(1,1) 0 bt ft −(bt + ft)
, (3.3)
where at, bt, ct, dt, ft ≥ 0 and locally integrable.
It should be noted that in general this process X is not Markovian consistent. However, un-
der some additional assumptions on functions a, b, c, d, f , the process X is strongly Markovian
consistent, weakly Markovian consistent, or weak-only Markovian consistent.
Next we will argue that the strongly Markovian consistency excludes contagion between the
components of X.
At time t, the infinitesimal rate of transitions for the component X1 from state 0 to state 1 is
λ
(0,0),(1,0)
t + λ
(0,0),(1,1)
t = at + ct, if X
2
t = 0,
λ
(0,1),(1,0)
t + λ
(0,1),(1,1)
t = at, if X
2
t = 1.
(3.4)
If ct = 0, then both results are the same. The state of X
2
t is irrelevant. Similarly, at time t the
rates of jumps for X1 from state 1 to state 0 are identical,
λ
(1,0),(0,0)
t + λ
(1,0),(0,1)
t = bt, if X
2
t = 0,
λ
(1,1),(0,0)
t + λ
(1,1),(0,1)
t = bt, if X
2
t = 1.
Thus, the infinitesimal rates of jumps for X1 from any state to the other states do not depend on
the state of X2t .
Likewise, if ct = 0, the state of X
1
t does not influence the transition rate of X
2 from state 0 to
state 1,
λ
(0,0),(0,1)
t + λ
(0,0),(1,1)
t = dt + ct, if X
1
t = 0,
λ
(1,0),(0,1)
t + λ
(1,0),(1,1)
t = dt, if X
1
t = 1,
(3.5)
and the transition rate of X2 from state 1 to state 0,
λ
(0,1),(0,0)
t + λ
(0,0),(1,0)
t = ft, if X
1
t = 0,
λ
(1,1),(0,0)
t + λ
(1,0),(1,0)
t = ft, if X
1
t = 1.
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We say that there is no contagion between X1 and X2. In fact, condition (M) is satisfied, thus the
process X is strongly Markovian consistent. This is the reason when we want to include contagion,
we rule out the structures of strong Markovian consistency.
Instead, if ct > 0, given the state of X
2
t the rates of jumps for X
1 from state 0 to state 1 in
(3.4) are different. The state of X2t will have an impact on how X
1 jumps from state 0 to state
1. Similarly, the state of X1t affects the rate of transitions for X
2 from state 0 to state 1 in (3.5).
Then we say there exists contagion between X1 and X2.
Remark 3.4. Note that in general the entry of simultaneous jump with zero value, for example
ct = 0, does not imply that the components cannot jump simultaneously, or the probability of
the common jump is zero. The probability of the simultaneous jump depends on the structure of
Λt. We need to check the corresponding transition probability matrix. Actually, given functions
a, b, d, f > 0 and c = 0 in (3.3) the probabilities of all simultaneous jumps are nonzero.
Another financial perspective of condition (M) is the financial resilience. In Example 3.3, if
ct = 0, the default of either party has no impact on the default of the counterparty. This does not
mean that X1 and X2 are independent or unconnected. Instead, it implies that the corresponding
financial institutions of X1 and X2 are financially resilient to the default of the counterparty. It is
an important feature in our model that we allow the flexibility for some financial institutions not
to be affected by the defaults of some financial institutions.
3.3 Construction of the weak-only Markov structures
Since strong Markovian consistency implies weak Markovian consistency, we can construct a larger
class of Markov structures, namely, weak-only Markov structures, to explore various dependence
structures between financial institutions. In view of Theorem A.3, the sufficient conditions for weak
Markovian consistency are formulated by the intertwining the semigroups of X and the prescribed
marginal processes. In the sequel, we assume that all financial institutions are affected by the
default of any financial institution. We discuss how to construct weak-only Markov structures for
different types of input data.
Given continuous data Λiu, 0 ≤ u ≤ T, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
Now, suppose that the model examiner predicts the marginal probability laws from today to some
future time T , i.e.,
(
Λiu, 0 ≤ u ≤ T
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. If the goal is to construct continuous time
weak-only Markov structures between time 0 to time T , the Algorithm I in Section 2.2 provides one
way to construct the weak-only Markov structures starting from today to time T . Namely, today
will be the initial time 0. Since the identity (2.7) is required to be satisfied for any 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T ,
seeking the algebraic relations between the entries of Λu, 0 ≤ u ≤ T is less likely. Under this cir-
cumstance, the structure imposed on the generator matrix (Λu, 0 ≤ u ≤ T ) becomes crucial. Some
examples are presented in Section 5.
Given discrete data Λitn+1 , n ∈ N, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
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Alternatively, assume that the input marginal generators are provided one step ahead of time. Say-
ing differently, suppose that today is at time t = tn, n ∈ N. The input data is Λ
i
tn+1
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
In this case, the objective is to construct the weak-only Markov structures from time tn to time
tn+1, step by step. Since we model the joint credit migration process as a Markov structure, by the
virtue of Markov property, whatever happened in the past does not affect the future. Instead of
the initial distribution of X, we care about the one-dimensional distribution of X at every single
time. We modify Algorithm I by the following.
Algorithm II (Weak-only Markov structures: discrete time)
Input: let valid generators Λitn+1 of Y
i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and a non-trivial distribution of Xtn be
given, i.e.,
P
(
Xtn =
(
x1, x2, . . . , xm
))
> 0,
(
x1, x2, . . . , xm
)
∈ Km. (3.6)
Step 1. Solve for valid infinitesimal generators Λtn+1 without satisfying condition (M) such that
ΘitnPtn,tn+1 = P̂
i
tn,tn+1
Θitn+1 , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, n ∈ N, (3.7)
where P̂itn,tn+1 is the semigroup of Λ
i
tn+1
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Step 2. If the solution Λtn+1 exists, then we have the weak-only Markov structures up to time tn+1
and move forward to next step. Otherwise, the weak-only Markov structure does not exist
with the given one-dimensional distribution P
(
Xtn =
(
x1, x2, . . . , xm
))
.
Step 3. We run the algorithm recursively until the terminal time T and end the algorithm.
Note that, if we fix the same ordering of the state spaces K and Km for every operator Φi and
Θitn , the homogeneous system (3.7) is underdetermined. Specifically, we have (|K
m| − 1) × |Km|
unknowns λx,ytn+1 and m× |K| × (|K| − 1)× |K| equations. It holds that
|Km| (|Km| − 1) ≥ m |K|2 (|K| − 1) , m, |K| ≥ 2.
In general, such a solution Λtn+1 is not unique. If the solution Λtn+1 is identified, then we construct
Λtn+1 forward and one step at a time, as the input marginals Λ
i
tn+1
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, become
available.
As time step approaches the infinitesimal level, in light of next proposition, we argue that (3.7)
remains to hold for any larger time steps. The constructed Markov structure in a forward recursive
approach is indeed a Markov structure up to time T .
Proposition 3.5. Let the assumptions in Theorem A.3 hold true. If we have
ΘitPt,v = P̂
i
t,vΘ
i
v, and Θ
i
vPv,s = P̂
i
v,sΘ
i
s, 0 ≤ t ≤ v ≤ s,
then
ΘitPt,s = P̂
i
t,sΘ
i
s.
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Proof. Since Pt,s and P̂
i
t,s satisfy the semigroup property, the result follows
ΘitPt,s = Θ
i
tPt,vPv,s = P̂
i
t,vΘ
i
vPv,s = P̂
i
t,vP̂
i
v,sΘ
i
s = P̂
i
t,sΘ
i
s.
3.4 Calibration of the dependence structure
As for the dependence structure, in case market prices of any ideal basket credit products are
available, we can derive theoretical prices and calibrate the dependence structure through market
prices. However, restricted to the current situation, it is rather unlikely. From the practical point
of view, one possible procedure may simulate several Markov structures and target the probability
distribution of Xtn+1 , i.e., P
(
Xtn+1 =
(
x1, x2, . . . , xm
))
,
(
x1, x2, . . . , xm
)
∈ Km at every time step.
Each Markov structure for the given collection of Markov chains stands for a possible scenario of
dependence structure of the financial economy. Once the stylized Markov structure is identified,
the rest Markov structures can be used in a stress test.
4 Measuring systemic risk, systemic dependence, and systemic
instability
When more than one Markov structure exists, i.e., the dependent Markov structures, there is a
potential uncertainty caused by the dependence structures. In what follows, we construct the
systemic risk measure, the systemic dependence measure, and the systemic instability measure to
explore this matter.
Recall that {Y 1, . . . , Y m} is a collection of Markov chains. Every process Y i has generator(
Λiu, u ≥ 0
)
with initial distribution µY
i
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, respectively. We construct a valid in-
finitesimal generator
(
ΛIu, u ≥ 0
)
by
ΛIu =
m∑
j=1
I⊗m,j
Λju
, u ≥ 0.
As known from Definition 3.2, a joint credit migration process modeled by
(
ΛIu, u ≥ 0
)
has in-
dependent components. We say this joint credit migration process has independence structure.
We denote by I the independence structure and call this financial system with fully independent
financial institutions as the neutral financial system.
In view of the Kolmogorov Existence Theorem, on the same probability space (Ω,F ,P) there
exists a unique multivariate Markov chain, say XI = (XI,1, . . . ,XI,m), generated by
(
ΛIu, u ≥ 0
)
.
Since
(
ΛIu, u ≥ 0
)
satisfies condition (M), XI is strongly Markovian consistent. Naturally, the
component XI,i is generated by
(
ΘiuΛ
I
uΦ
i, u ≥ 0
)
. If we assume that the initial distribution µX
I,i
is identical to µY
i
, then every XI,i has the same probability law as Y i. It turns out XI is a strong
Markov structure. We would like to emphasize that contagion is excluded from a joint credit
migration process modeled by XI .
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Now, we denote by zi ∈ K, i = 1, , . . . ,m, corresponding to some credit rating. Let zi, 0 ≤
t ≤ T < ∞, and h ∈ M be fixed. We would like to compute the conditional probability that, at
future time T , at least h financial institutions are in credit rating zi conditional on the information
available at time t. That is,
P
(
m∑
i=1
1
{XI,i
T
=zi}
≥ h
∣∣∣∣ XIt
)
, zi ∈ K, h ∈ M, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.1)
Suppose that we model the joint credit migration process X as a Markov structure for the
collection {Y 1, . . . , Y m}. Then the components of X are Markovian, and necessarily generated by
Λiu = Θ
i
uΛuΦ
i, u ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
If a nontrivial solution
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
exists, which is a solution different from
(
ΛIu, u ≥ 0
)
, it defines
a dependence structure, say D. Accordingly, we compute the conditional probability
P
(
m∑
i=1
1{XD,iT =zi}
≥ h
∣∣∣∣ XDt
)
, zi ∈ K, h ∈M, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (4.2)
where XD has generator
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
. If XD is weak-only Markovian consistent, a joint credit
migration process modeled by XD allows contagion between individual credit migrations.
Before we introduce the following definitions, let X denote the collection of Markov chains with
values in Km. We give a definition for systemic risk measure.
Definition 4.1 (Systemic Risk Measure). Suppose that XD is a Markov structure for a collection
of Markov chains {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}. Let z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm) ∈ K
m be fixed. We define a function
νz : [0,∞) × [0, T ]×M×X ×Km → [0, 1],
νz
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
:= P
(
m∑
i=1
1{XD,iT =zi}
≥ h
∣∣∣∣ XDt = x
)
.
In particular, if every zi is the corresponding default rating, we call this function the systemic
risk measure.
In view of Definition 4.1, if we ignore the dependence structure, the concept of measuring
systemic risk is quite common in finance literature, for instance, the joint default probability of m
financial institutions. We argue that, using this systemic risk measure to monitor systemic risk is
not rigorous. Because this measure neglects the dependence structure within the financial system
and solely signals systemic risk once the probability reaches predetermined level. It may happen
that different dependence structures contribute to the same level of systemic risk.
Accordingly, we define the dependence measure as the difference between (4.1) and (4.2). Saying
differently, we normalize the probability obtained from the dependence structure with respect to
the independence structure. Since the Markov structures XD and XI are subject to the same pool
of marginal laws, the normalization of (4.2) has solid grounds. When every zi is the corresponding
default rating, we have the systemic dependence measure.
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Definition 4.2 (Systemic Dependence Measure). Suppose that XD is a Markov structure for a
collection of Markov chains {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}. Let z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm) ∈ K
m be fixed. We define a
function ρz : [0,∞)× [0, T ]×M×X ×Km → [−1, 1],
ρz
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
:= νz
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
− νz
(
T, t, h,XI , x
)
. (4.3)
In particular, if every zi is the corresponding default rating, we call this function the systemic
dependence measure.
In view of Definition 4.2, ρz
(
T, t, h,XD , x
)
measures the disequilibrium with respect to the neu-
tral system, i.e., the independence structure. Not only do we compute the conditional probability
of at least h financial institutions being in default at time T , but we also concern this probability
deviating from the neutral system to encompass the effect resulting from the dependence structure.
Note that, we restrict ourselves to the Markov structure XD starting from the same initial
distribution as XI . Although processes XD and XI evolve from the same initial distribution, their
one-dimensional distributions at time t, P
(
XDt = x
)
and P
(
XIt = x
)
, are generally different. In
the following, we prove that the distribution of XDt is absolutely continuous with respect to the
distribution of XIt .
Proposition 4.3. Assume that XI and XD are Markov structures for a collection of Markov chains
{Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}. Suppose that XI and XD evolve from the same initial distribution. Then the
distribution of XDt is absolutely continuous with respect to the distribution of X
I
t .
Proof. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ K
m. Assume that P
(
XIt = x
)
= 0 for some t,
P
(
XIt = x
)
=
∑
z∈Km
P
(
XI0 = z
)
P
(
XIt = x | X
I
0 = z
)
= 0.
It remains to show P
(
XDt = x
)
= 0. Indeed, if the initial distribution is nontrivial, i.e., P
(
XI0 = z
)
6=
0 for some z, then P
(
XIt = x | X
I
0 = z
)
= 0. By independence of XI , we know at least one of
P
(
X
I,i
t = xi | X
I,i
0 = zi
)
= 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Since XI,i and XD,i have the identical law as
Y i, it follows immediately P
(
X
D,i
t = xi | X
D,i
0 = zi
)
= 0 for the same component of XI with
P
(
X
I,i
t = xi | X
I,i
0 = zi
)
= 0.
Clearly, because XDt is a multivariate Markov chain, we must have P
(
XDt = x | X
D
0 = z
)
= 0.
Thus, for the same nontrivial initial distribution,
P
(
XDt = x
)
=
∑
z∈Km
P
(
XD0 = z
)
P
(
XDt = x | X
D
0 = z
)
= 0.
To this end, motivated by Lo´pez-Ruiz, Mancici and Calbet [LRMC10], in order to emphasize the
uncertainty resulting from the distributions of XDt and X
I
t , we introduce the instability measure.
In what follows, we adopt the convention log
(
0
0
)
= 0.
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Definition 4.4 (Systemic Instability Measure). Suppose that XD is a Markov structure for a
collection of Markov chains {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}. Let z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm) ∈ K
m be fixed. We define a
bounded function κz from [0,∞)× [0, T ]×M×X ×Km → R,
κz
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
:= ρz
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
×
 ∑
y∈Km
P
(
XDt = y
)
log
P
(
XDt = y
)
P
(
XIt = y
)
 . (4.4)
In particular, if every zi is the corresponding default rating, we call this function the systemic
instability measure.
It should be noted that the second term in (4.4) measures the distance between the one-
dimensional distributions of XD and XI at time t. This quantity is also known as Kullback-
Leibler divergence or relative entropy. In our case, the term is actually the mutual information
I
(
X
D,1
t ,X
D,2
t , . . . ,X
D,m
t
)
. Due to the non-negativity of the relative entropy, this term will not flip
the sign of the systemic dependence measure. Instead, the second term in (4.4) will scale the depen-
dence measure based on their one-dimensional distributions. The properties of the Kullback-Leibler
divergence are well-studied, for instance, the upper bounds. We refer the reader to [CT06, PD16],
and references therein.
4.1 Classifications of systemic dependence measure and systemic instability
measure
We have created measures to monitor financial stability. From now we denote by K the default
rating and we focus on (νz, ρz , κz) for z = (K, . . . ,K).
In view of Definition 4.2, the systemic dependence measure depends on T, t, h and D. It should
be noted that the systemic dependence measure is evaluated based on different dependence struc-
tures. For instance, let XD be a weak-only Markov structure. Then we can compare the conditional
probability of the event under a joint credit migration process embedded with contagious mechanism
to the conditional probability of the same event under a joint credit migration process excluding
contagion.
Financially speaking, when we fix h = m and T , the event of interest is all financial institutions
in default at some future time T . We measure the probability of this financial system that will be in
Armageddon at future time T . It follows that the systemic dependence measure depends on t,Xt.
In view of (4.3), at time t and XDt = x, if the systemic dependence measure ρ
z
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
> 0,
it means that the probability of all financial institutions in default rating at future time T under a
joint credit migration process with dependence structure D is strictly larger than the probability
of the same event under the process with independence structure. In other words, the financial
system with dependence structure D has greater exposure to the risk in Armageddon. Under this
dependence structure D, the financial system is no better than the neutral financial system. We
say for the pair (t, x), this financial system with dependence structure D is of unfavorable systemic
dependence.
At time t and XDt = x, if the systemic dependence measure ρ
z
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
= 0, it means that
the financial system with dependence structure D behaves like the neutral financial system. Then
16
we call this financial system with dependence structure D a neutral systemic dependence for the pair
(t, x). By analogy, if at time t and XDt = x the systemic dependence measure ρ
z
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
< 0,
it suggests that the financial system with dependence structure D has less exposure to the risk of
simultaneously default at future time T . This financial system benefits from the current dependence
structure. We say that for the pair (t, x) this financial system with dependence structure D has
favorable systemic dependence.
According to the sign of this systemic dependence measure, we categorize the dependence status
of the financial system into the following:
ρz
(
T, t,m,XD, x
)
> 0, unfavorable systemic dependence;
= 0, neutral systemic dependence;
< 0, favorable systemic dependence.
Since the Kullback-Leibler divergence will not change the sign of the systemic dependence measure,
the systemic instability measure is classified as three cases:
κz
(
T, t,m,XD, x
)
> 0, systemic risk;
= 0, systemic indifference;
< 0, systemic benefit.
4.2 Properties of systemic dependence measure and systemic instability mea-
sure
In this section, we provide two important properties of our systemic dependence measure and
systemic instability measure. These properties are mainly inherited from the virtues of the Markov
structures theory. The first property is that both measures are invariant with respect to the
permutation of the components. This property is essential. No matter how the ordering of the
financial institutions is, the ordering will not change the values of these two systemic measures.
The second property is the law invariance. The major financial meaning is that subject to the same
pool of financial institutions, only the financial systems with the identical dependence structure
will produce the same levels of the systemic dependence measure and systemic instability measure
at every time.
We start with the important properties of Kronecker product.
Lemma 4.5. (i) ([HJ94, 4.2.6]) Let A,B,C be matrices. Then (A⊗B)⊗ C = A⊗ (B ⊗ C).
(ii) ([HS81, Section 3]) Let A and B be two matrices. Then A⊗ B and B ⊗ A are permutation
equivalent. Namely, there exists permutation matrices P,Q such that
A⊗B = P (B ⊗A)Q.
In particular, if A and B are square matrices, then A⊗B and B⊗A are permutation similar.
We can take P = Q⊤.
17
Next, we show that although rearranging the components of X will change the matrix defined
in the right hand side of (3.2), the independence relationship between the components will not be
altered.
Proposition 4.6. The infinitesimal generator constructed by (3.2) is permutation similar with
respect to the components of X =
(
X1,X2, . . . ,Xm
)
.
Proof. We prove by induction. It is clear that for m = 1 any matrix is similar to itself. Let m = 2.
We fix the ordering of state space of X =
(
X1,X2
)
. Assume that the permutation pi with respect
to the state space is given by
pi =
(
(0, 0) (0, 1) · · · (K,K)
pi ((0, 0)) pi ((0, 1)) · · · pi ((K,K))
)
. (4.5)
The permutation matrix Ppi corresponding to the permutation pi is of the form,
Ppi =

epi((0,0))
epi((0,1))
...
epi((K,K))
, (4.6)
where ej is the canonical basis. Then Λt is permutation similar to A
2
t ⊗ I + I⊗A
1
t ,
Λt = A
1
t ⊗ I + I⊗A
2
t
= Ppi
(
I⊗A1t
)
P⊤pi + Ppi
(
A2t ⊗ I
)
P⊤pi
= Ppi
(
A2t ⊗ I + I⊗A
1
t
)
P⊤pi .
In view of Definition 3.2, a process generated by the infinitesimal generator A2t ⊗ I + I ⊗ A
1
t has
components ordered by
(
X2,X1
)
. We can prove by induction on the number of components of X
for m ≥ 3.
Remark 4.7. Let X1 and X2 be distinct. The independence generators for the processes with
the components ordered by
(
X1,X2
)
and by
(
X2,X1
)
are different. But they contain the same
information up to permutation matrices.
Proposition 4.8. A Markov structure X =
(
X1,X2, . . . ,Xm
)
for a collection of Markov chains
{Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m} is permutation similar with respect to the permutation of {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}.
Proof. When we choose the ordering of the state space of Y i and the arrangement of the components
of this collection, the state space of X and Xi will be fixed. Now, we permute {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}
and the state space of Y i’s. Let Ppi be the permutation matrix corresponding to the permutation pi
18
with respect to the state space of X. We denote by Ppi the matrix representation of the permutation
pi with respect to the state space of Xi,
pi =
(
0 1 · · · K
pi (0) pi (1) · · · pi (K)
)
. (4.7)
Since the transition probability matrix is non-singular, we can always perform similarity transfor-
mation for any transition probability matrix. We have that Pt,s and P
pi(i)
t,s are permutation-similar,
so are P̂it,s and P̂
pi(i)
t,s ,
Pt,s = PpiP
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi ,
and
P̂it,s = PpiP̂
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi .
Note that ΘitPt,s = P̂
i
t,sΘ
i
s, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, is the sufficient condition for weak Markovian
consistency. It suffices to show this sufficient condition remains true under the permutation of the
components. Replacing the similarity transformation of Pt,s and P̂
i
t,s into the sufficient condition,
it follows that
ΘitPpiP
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi = PpiP̂
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi Θ
i
s
ΘitPpiP
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi Ppi = PpiP̂
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi Θ
i
sPpi
ΘitPpiP
pi(i)
t,s = PpiP̂
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi Θ
i
sPpi
P⊤pi Θ
i
tPpiP
pi(i)
t,s = P
⊤
pi PpiP̂
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi Θ
i
sPpi
P⊤pi Θ
i
tPpiP
pi(i)
t,s = P̂
pi(i)
t,s P
⊤
pi Θ
i
sPpi
Θ˜
pi(i)
t P
pi(i)
t,s = P̂
pi(i)
t,s Θ˜
pi(i)
s ,
where Θ˜
pi(i)
t := P
⊤
pi Θ
i
tPpi, and for any permutation matrix P
−1
pi = P
⊤
pi .
Since P⊤pi Θ
i
tPpi merely changes the orders of columns and rows of Θ
i
t, in view of Definition 2.3,
Θ˜
pi(i)
t is well-defined with respect to the permutations pi and pi. After the permutation, the sufficient
condition Θ˜
pi(i)
t P
pi(i)
t,s = P̂
pi(i)
t,s Θ˜
pi(i)
s still holds. Thus the corresponding multivariate process remains
a Markov structure with respect to the permutation of {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}.
Next, we prove the first important property.
Theorem 4.9. The systemic dependence measure is invariant with respect to the permutation of
the components of X.
Proof. In view of Proposition 4.6 and Proposition 4.8, we know that a Markov structure is indepen-
dent of the ordering of the Markov chains within the collection and the state space of the Markov
chain member. All that matters is whether the generators are being tracked correspondingly. Thus,
we have that
νz
(
T, t, h,XI , x
)
= νz
(
T, t, h,XIpi , pi(x)
)
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and
νz
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
= νz
(
T, t, h,XDpi , pi(x)
)
.
We conclude the proof.
Corollary 4.10. The systemic instability measure is invariant with respect to the permutation of
the components of X.
Proof. Since the relative entropy is invariant with respect to the permutation of the components
of X, the result follows.
We end this section with the law invariance property.
Theorem 4.11 (Law invariance). Let XD and XD
′
be Markov structures for {Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y m}.
If XD and XD
′
have the same law with respect to P, then we have
ρz
(
T, t, h,XD, x
)
= ρz
(
T, t, h,XD
′
, x
)
, z, x ∈ Km, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, h ∈ M.
Proof. Note that XD,XD
′
are multivariate Markov chains. We denote by ΛDu and Λ
D′
u , u ≥ 0
the infinitesimal generators of XD and XD
′
, respectively. Markov chains XD,XD
′
have the same
finite-dimensional distribution if and only if ΛDu = Λ
D′
u , u ≥ 0. Besides, Λ
D
u = Λ
D′
u , u ≥ 0 if and
only if PX
D
t,s = P
XD
′
t,s , 0 ≤ t ≤ s. Then we have
Λiu = Θ
i
uΛ
D
u Φ
i = ΘiuΛ
D′
u Φ
i, u ≥ 0, i ∈ M.
It follows that the corresponding generator of independent structure is identical,
m∑
j=1
I⊗m,j
Λju
=
m∑
j=1
I⊗ · · · ⊗ Λju ⊗ · · · ⊗ I, u ≥ 0.
For any z ∈ K, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, h ∈ M, we have
ρz
(
T, t, h,XD , x
)
= P
 m∑
j=1
1{XD,jT =zj}
≥ h
∣∣∣∣ XDt = x
− P
 m∑
j=1
1{XI,jT =zj}
≥ h
∣∣∣∣ XIt = x

= P
 m∑
j=1
1
{
X
D′,j
T
=zj
} ≥ h
∣∣∣∣ XD′t = x
− P
 m∑
j=1
1{XI,jT =zj}
≥ h
∣∣∣∣ XIt = x

= ρz
(
T, t, h,XD
′
, x
)
,
where the second equality comes from the fact that the semigroups of XD,XD
′
are the same.
Corollary 4.12. The systemic instability measure is law-invariant.
Proof. The second term in (4.4) is law-invariant due to PX
D
t,s = P
XD
′
t,s , 0 ≤ t ≤ s. Together with
Theorem 4.11 we conclude the proof.
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5 Numerical results
In the case of Examples in [Cha17] and [BJN13], we have full knowledge about how the initial
distribution of a bivariate Markov chain and the algebraic structures of infinitesimal generator
(Λu, u ≥ 0) of X determine different types of Markovian consistency. Therefore, we will follow up
on those examples here. We present in this section the numerical study on the systemic instability
measure of various Markov structures for a collection of Markov chains {Y 1, Y 2}. The main objec-
tive is to explain financial meanings of various dependence structures and to study the robustness
of proposed measures in the simple setting.
5.1 Model specification
Here, we consider a financial system of two financial institutions. We denote by Y i the credit rating
process of the ith financial institution, i = 1, 2. Instead of taking all credit ratings as the state
space of Y i, we presume several credit events as default. Thus the credit status of each financial
institution is in either non-default or default. State 0 represents the non-default state, and state 1
stands for the default state. Moreover, for simplicity, we suppose that once the financial institution
defaults, it cannot return to the non-default state. It means that state 1 is an absorbing state
for every Y i. We further assume that at time 0 each Y i starts from the non-default state with
probability 1, P
(
Y i0 = 0
)
= 1, i = 1, 2.
Next, let 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v3 ≤ · · · ≤ vn < ∞. We consider time intervals: [0, v1), [v1, v2),
[v2, v3), . . ., and [vn,∞). Assume that X
D is a bivariate Markov chain with the initial distribution
P (X0 = (0, 0)) = 1 and the infinitesimal generator
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
,
ΛDu =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −(au + bu + cu) au bu cu
(0,1) 0 −du 0 du
(1,0) 0 0 −fu fu
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
, (5.1)
where for any 0 ≤ u <∞, au, bu, cu, du, fu ≥ 0, and au, bu, cu, du, fu are piecewise constant on time
intervals [0, v1), . . . , [vn,∞).
Note that, the procedure to construct Markov structures is to take the generator
(
Λiu, u ≥ 0
)
of
Y i, i = 1, 2, as initial inputs. Then one constructs Markov structures corresponding to {Y 1, Y 2}.
If, additionally, we have au, bu, cu > 0, and
au + cu 6= fu bu + cu 6= du,
then XD is weak-only Markovian consistent. Each XD,i is therefore has generator
Λiu = Θ
i
uΛ
D
u Φ
i, u ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. (5.2)
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Subsequently, we construct the independent infinitesimal generator
(
ΛIu, u ≥ 0
)
of XI by
ΛIu =
2∑
j=1
I⊗2,j
Λju
= Λ1u ⊗ I + I⊗ Λ
2
u.
Then we compute the corresponding systemic measures of the Markov structures XD for {Y 1, Y 2}.
Throughout the examples, in view of the systemic instability measure defined by (4.4), we let
t vary from 0 to a finite time horizon 30 with step size ∆t = 0.2
(
≈ 152
)
, and choose the monitor
window ∆T := T − t. We are interested in the case of z = (1, 1) where both components are in
default. Also, we are interested in the event when both financial institutions default, h = 2. Now,
the systemic instability measure is a function of the current time t and XD. Thus, the systemic
instability measure is given by
κ(1,1)
(
t+∆T, t, 2,XD, (0, 0)
)
= ρ(1,1)
(
t+∆T, t, 2,XD, (0, 0)
)
×
 ∑
y∈Km
P
(
XDt = y
)
log
P
(
XDt = y
)
P
(
XIt = y
)
 ,
where
ρ(1,1)
(
t+∆T, t, 2,XD, (0, 0)
)
= P
 2∑
j=1
1{XD,jt+∆T=1}
≥ 2
∣∣∣∣ XDt = (0, 0)
 − P
 2∑
j=1
1{XI,jt+∆T=1}
≥ 2
∣∣∣∣ XIt = (0, 0)
 . (5.3)
When the time t proceeds, we have a sequence of values of the systemic instability measure that
reflect the financial status of the future time t + ∆T . The specifications of the common model
parameters can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Specifications of Model Parameters
Parameters h m ∆T v1 v2 v3 v4 v5
Value 2 2 3 6 10 20 26 30
5.2 Examples
In the following examples, we will mainly analyze the properties of the corresponding systemic
instability measure computed based on different dependence structures ΛDu . Whereas we will present
the composite terms of systemic instability measure in detail for Example 5.1.
Example 5.1 (Contagious common jumps). Let Y 1, Y 2 be Markov chains with generators
Λiu =
( 0 1
0 −λiu λ
i
u
1 0 0
)
, u ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, (5.4)
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respectively, where
λ1u =
cu (a+ b+ cu) e
−
∫ u
0
(a+b+cv) dv + abe−bu
ae−bu + cue
−
∫ u
0
(a+b+cv) dv
λ2u =
cu (a+ b+ cu) e
−
∫ u
0
(a+b+cv) dv + abe−au
be−au + cue
−
∫ u
0
(a+b+cv) dv
,
(5.5)
and a, b, cu > 0, and cu is piecewise constant.
We construct an independence generator by Λ1u and Λ
2
u,
ΛIu = Λ
1
u ⊗ I + I⊗ Λ
2
u =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −(λ1u + λ
2
u) λ
2
u λ
1
u 0
(0,1) 0 −λ1u 0 λ
1
u
(1,0) 0 0 −λ2u λ
2
u
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
. (5.6)
The generator ΛIu satisfies condition (M). Now, we solve for a solution
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
of
Λiu = Θ
i
uΛ
D
u Φ
i, u ≥ 0, i = 1, 2,
where
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
is of the form
ΛDu =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −(a+ b+ cu) a b cu
(0,1) 0 −b 0 b
(1,0) 0 0 −a a
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
. (5.7)
It should be noted that since cu > 0, a bivariate Markov chain X
D =
(
XD,1,XD,2
)
generated by
(5.7) is a weak-only Markov structure for {Y 1, Y 2}. If we take cu = 0 for all u ≥ 0 in (5.7), then
we have the independence structure. The parameter cu in (5.7) is the key element that captures
the contagion of simultaneous jumps between the components. Thus, our first goal is to study how
the parameter cu affects the systemic instability measure.
Next, we consider another generator ΛSu of the form,
ΛSu =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −
(
λ1u + λ
2
u − gu
)
λ2u − gu λ
1
u − gu gu
(0,1) 0 −λ1u 0 λ
1
u
(1,0) 0 0 −λ2u λ
2
u
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
, u ≥ 0, (5.8)
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where 0 ≤ gu ≤ min
(
λ1u, λ
2
u
)
. The generator ΛSu satisfies condition (M) as well, and a Markov
chain XS generated by
(
ΛSu , u ≥ 0
)
is a strong Markov structure for {Y 1, Y 2}. Moreover, if gu = 0,
(5.8) reduces to independence structure (5.6). Note that, by construction, the ith component
of a bivariate chain generated respectively by either ΛDu ,Λ
I
u or Λ
S
u has identical prescribed law(
Λiu, u ≥ 0
)
in (5.4).
In the first part of the numerical analysis, we restrict ourselves to the structure (5.7) and show
the compositions of systemic instability measure. For simplicity, we assume that the financial
system has finite lifetime T = 30 and let t vary. Two scenarios are considered: piecewise increasing
cu and piecewise decreasing cu. The parameters are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameters for Example 5.1 (Contagious Common Jumps): κ(1,1)
(
30, t, 2,XD , (0, 0)
)
Parameters
Time Periods
[0, 3) [3, 10) [10, 30) [30,∞)
a 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
b 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Scenario 1: cu piecewise increasing 0.08 0.15 0.2 0.2
Scenario 2: cu piecewise decreasing 0.08 0.03 0.003 0.003
Figure 1 on page 26 shows the result of κ(1,1)
(
30, t, 2,XD , (0, 0)
)
. We observe that at the initial
time t = 0 and the termination t = 30, the values of the systemic instability measure are both
zero. They come from different reasons. At time 0, it results from the same initial distribution.
However, at time T , it is caused by the end of the simulated processes. Note that we fix parameter
T in this simulation. Although in both cases (piecewise increasing and piecewise decreasing), we
have the same parameters in the first period [0, 3), in general, we should not expect the same level
of systemic instability measure, that depends on the entire simulated processes.
In the second part of the numerical analysis, we examine the systemic instability measure for
two different dependence structures (5.7) and (5.8). In addition to the parameters in Table 2, we
take parameter gu = ηmin
(
λ1u, λ
2
u
)
with η = 0, 0.5, 0.8, 1. If η = 0, the structure (5.7) becomes the
independence structure (5.6).
In Figure 2 on page 26 and Figure 3 on page 26, we compare the systemic instability measure
of the weak-only Markov structure to the strong Markov structures. It should be noted that when
η = 1, one of the components cannot jump individually. For instance, if min
(
λ1u, λ
2
u
)
= λ2u, then
the probability for XS,2 jumping individually to state 1 is zero. In such a case, the level of systemic
instability measure is highest. We argue that, since condition (M) is satisfied, the state of XS,1
will not have an influence on how XS,2 changes its state. However, if XS,2 changes to state 1,
XS,1 must jump to state 1 as well. Financially speaking, the corresponding financial institution
XS,2 will not default individually. However, if XS,2 defaults, then XS,1 must default as well. The
component XS,2 contributes significantly to systemic risk.
After visualizing the basic behaviors of systemic instability measure, let us switch gears to
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(c) Systemic instability measure
Figure 1: Systemic Dependence Measure, Kullback-Leibler Divergence, and Systemic Intability
Measure for Example 5.1 (Contagious Common Jumps)
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Figure 2: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.1 (Contagious Common Jumps) with Piece-
wise Increasing cu
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Figure 3: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.1 (Contagious Common Jumps) with Piece-
wise Decreasing cu
more practical case: κ(1,1)
(
t+∆T, t, 2,XD, (0, 0)
)
. As ∆T is fixed, the measure evaluates a fixed
monitor period, from time t to time t+∆T , of the systemic condition at time t. It will allow us to
routinely monitor the future condition of the financial system, for instance, on the weekly basis. We
consider two scenarios for the parameter cu fluctuating in different patterns. In the first scenario,
cu starts with small value, then it becomes large and go down. The interpretation is that both
financial institutions begins with good conditions. Then they deteriorate simultaneously through
the common jumps factor, and become better again through the common jumps factor. Instead,
the second scenario, cu will start with large value and cycle. We collect the parameters in Table 3.
In Figure 4 on page 27, all sequences of systemic instability measure fluctuate. As the monitor
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Table 3: Parameters for Example 5.1 (Contagious Common Jumps): κ(1,1)
(
t+∆T, t, 2,XD, (0, 0)
)
Parameters
Time Periods
[0, 6) [6, 10) [10, 20) [20, 26) [26, 30) [30,∞)
a 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
b 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Scenario 1: cu 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.04
Scenario 2: cu 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.05
window ∆T = 3, the systemic instability measure uproars at t = 3 reflecting the sudden change of
cu in period [6, 10). Analogously, the measure decreases at t = 7 indicating the jump of cu in period
[10, 20). Similar results can be observed in Figure 5 on page 28. We would like to emphasize that
one Markov structure may behave more stable or unstable than other Markov structures throughout
the entire tracking period.
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Figure 4: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.1 (Contagious Common Jumps): Scenario
1
Now, we use the same data in Table 3 while changing the lengths of monitor window ∆T ,
∆T = 0.6, 1, 3, 5. The comparison is presented in Figure 6 on page 28. The sequence of systemic
instability measure with shorter monitor window ∆T is embraced by the longer monitor window
∆T ,∣∣∣κ(1,1) (t+∆T1, t, 2,XD , (0, 0))∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣κ(1,1) (t+∆T2, t, 2,XD , (0, 0))∣∣∣ , 0 ≤ ∆T1 ≤ ∆T2 <∞.
From the perspective of risk management, this property should be expected as the uncertainty of
a financial system for a longer period is generally higher.
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Figure 5: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.1 (Contagious Common Jumps): Sceneario
2
0 6 10 20 26 30
Time
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
Sy
st
em
ic 
In
st
ab
ilit
y 
M
ea
su
re
∆T = 0.6
∆T = 1
∆T = 3
∆T = 5
(a) Scenario 1
0 6 10 20 26 30
Time
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Sy
st
em
ic 
In
st
ab
ilit
y 
M
ea
su
re
∆T = 0.6
∆T = 1
∆T = 3
∆T = 5
(b) Scenario 2
Figure 6: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.1 (Contagious Common Jumps) with Dif-
ferent Lengths of Monitor Window ∆T
Example 5.2 (Extreme contagion). Assume that Y i is generated by Λiu,
Λiu =
( 0 1
0 −cu cu
1 0 0
)
, u ≥ 0, i = 1, 2.
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We solve for the solution
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
of the form,
ΛDu =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −cu 0 0 cu
(0,1) 0 0 0 0
(1,0) 0 0 0 0
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
, (5.9)
where cu > 0 and piecewise constant. In view of (5.9), if the components jump, they must jump
simultaneously. Note that in this structure, the transition probability for individual jump is zero.
Hence, we call this structure as extreme contagion.
The parameters of this example are summarized in Table 4. We investigate the general proper-
ties of the systemic instability measure for the structure (5.9), and then compare the results to the
structure (5.8) with different gu’s.
Table 4: Parameters for Example 5.2 (Extreme Contagion)
Parameters
Time Periods
[0, 6) [6, 10) [10, 20) [20, 26) [26, 30) [30,∞)
Scenario 1: cu 0.01 0.1 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03
Scenario 2: cu 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03
In Figure 7 on page 30 and Figure 8 on page 30, an interesting observation is that the systemic
instability measure of extreme contagion coincides with the measure obtained by gu = min
(
λ1u, λ
2
u
)
.
The mathematical explanations are given below. First, Y 1 and Y 2 have the same law. For the
structure (5.9), the chain does not move if it is not in state (0, 0). For the structure (5.8), condition
(P) is satisfied and the transition probability of individual jumps from state (0, 0) is 0. Thus both
structures produce the same levels of systemic instability.
Example 5.3 (Extreme anti-contagion). Consider Markov chains Y 1, Y 2 with generators
Λiu =
( 0 1
0 −λiu λ
i
u
1 0 0
)
, u ≥ 0, i = 1, 2,
respectively, where
λ1u =
bu (au + bu) e
−
∫ u
0
(av+bv) dv
au + bue
−
∫ u
0
(av+bv) dv
λ2u =
au (au + bu) e
−
∫ u
0
(av+bv) dv
bu + aue
−
∫ u
0
(av+bv) dv
,
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Figure 7: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.2 (Extreme Contagion): Scenario 1
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Figure 8: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.2 (Extreme Contagion): Scenario 2
and au, bu > 0 and piecewise constant.
We solve for a Markov structure XD for
{
Y 1, Y 2
}
with generator
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
of the form,
ΛDu =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −(au + bu) au bu 0
(0,1) 0 0 0 0
(1,0) 0 0 0 0
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
, (5.10)
where au, bu > 0.
Unlike the structure (5.9) of extreme contagion, in view of the structure (5.10), every component
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jumps individually. It is impossible for both components to jump simultaneously,
P
 2∑
j=1
1{XD,jT =1}
≥ 2
∣∣∣∣ XDt = (0, 0)
 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.11)
We call this structure as extreme anti-contagion. The theoretical value of the systemic depen-
dence measure is non-positive for any 0 ≤ t < ∞. The parameters for this example are given in
Table 5.
Table 5: Parameters for Example 5.3 (Extreme Anti-contagion)
Parameters
Time Periods
[0, 6) [6, 10) [10, 20) [20, 26) [26, 30) [30,∞)
Scenario 1: au = bu 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01
Scenario 2: au = bu 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05
In Figure 9 on page 31 and Figure 10 on page 32, every curve stands for the systemic instability
measure as a function of t. We observe that the systemic instability measures are indeed non-
positive for the structure (5.10), and thus the financial system has favorable systemic dependence
and is of systemic benefit. Besides, the financial system shares more favorable systemic benefit
when the values of au, bu get larger.
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Figure 9: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.3 (Extreme Anti-contagion): Scenario 1
Example 5.4 (Systemic importance). Consider Markov chains Y 1, Y 2 with generators
Λiu =
( 0 1
0 −λiu λ
i
u
1 0 0
)
, u ≥ 0, i = 1, 2,
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Figure 10: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.3 (Extreme Anti-contagion): Scenario 2
respectively, where
λ1u = θu (cu − du) + du
λ2u = au + cu
θu =
e−
∫ u
0
(av+cv) dv
cu−du
au+cu−du
e−
∫ u
0
(av+cv) dv + au
au+cu−du
e−
∫ u
0
dv dv
,
with piecewise constant au, cu, du > 0, cu 6= du. Note that if cu = du, the generator in (5.12) is a
strong Markov structure and coincides with the ΛSu with gu = min
(
λ1u, λ
2
u
)
.
It can be verified that a bivariate Markov chain XD =
(
XD,1,XD,2
)
generated by
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
,
ΛDu =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −(au + cu) au 0 cu
(0,1) 0 −du 0 du
(1,0) 0 0 −(au + cu) au + cu
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
, (5.12)
is a weak Markov structure for
{
Y 1, Y 2
}
. Specifically, XD,1 is Markovian in its own filtration,
but not the filtration of XD. Whereas XD,2 is Markovian in the filtration FX , and necessarily
Markovian in its own filtration.
In view of (5.12), we know that
P
(
XDs = (1, 0) | X
D
t = (0, 0)
)
= 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ s,
and
0 < P
(
XD,1s = 1 | X
D
t = (0, 0)
)
6= P
(
XD,1s = 1 | X
D
t = (0, 1)
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ s.
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It means that XD,1 cannot be in default alone. Saying differently, if XD,1 defaults, XD,2 must have
defaulted at least earlier than XD,1. Moreover, it holds that
P
(
XD,2s = 1 | X
D
t = (0, 0)
)
= P
(
XD,2s = 1 | X
D
t = (1, 0)
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ s.
Whether XD,1 defaults or not, it does not impact on the default of XD,2. The relationship between
XD,1 and XD,2 is similar to parasitism, and XD,2 is the host. During a crisis, we would like to
prevent XD,2 from default to avoid Armageddon. Financially, we say that XD,2 is systemically
more important than XD,1. One remark should be made that this relationship between XD,1 and
XD,2 is embedded in the structure of ΛDu given in (5.12). It is independent of functions a, c, d.
Table 6: Parameters for Example 5.4 (Systemic Importance)
Parameters
Time Periods
[0, 6) [6, 10) [10, 20) [20, 26) [26, 30) [30,∞)
Scenario 1:
au 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
cu 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.09
du 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Scenario 2:
au 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
cu 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02
du 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Now, we turn our attention to the numerical results. In what follows, we would like to study
the effect of the second distress. The parameters are provided in Table 6. Both scenarios have the
same parameters in au and du, but different cu cycling. In scenario 1, the simulated system embarks
from good condition, in the sense of the magnitude of cu, while in scenario 2 the simulated system
starts from bad condition. In Figure 11 on page 34 and Figure 12 on page 34, XD produces the
highest level in systemic instability in both scenarios. This unsymmetrical relationship between two
components is considered more risky than the other dependence structures, which allow individual
default symmetrically. Next observation is regarding the second distress occurred in period [26, 30)
of scenario 1 and in period [20, 26) of scenario 2. Although the impact of the second distress is
inconclusive4, the systemic instability in scenario 2 is indeed higher if the system starts from the
bad condition.
Example 5.5 (Two weak-only Markov strcutures). In this final example, we will compare systemic
instability measures of two weak-only Markov structures for the same collection of identical Markov
chains {Y 1, Y 2}. Specifically, we take a = b in (5.5) and obtain λ1u = λ
2
u. We use this simple
example to show that a financial system with distinct dependence structures produces different
levels of systemic instability. In addition, the results are consistent with financial intuitions.
4We may have higher systemic instability in the second distress with different time periods setting. For instance,
see Figure 13 on page 35 by using the same parameters of scenario 1 in Table 6 with time periods [0, 6), [6, 8), [8, 10),
[10, 12), [12, 15), [15,∞).
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Figure 11: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.4 (Systemic Importance): Scenario 1
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Figure 12: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.4 (Systemic Importance): Scenario 2
The first weak-only Markov structure
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
is of the form
ΛDu =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −(2a+ cu) a a cu
(0,1) 0 −a 0 a
(1,0) 0 0 −a a
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
, (5.13)
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Figure 13: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.4 (Systemic Importance): Scenario 1 with
Time Periods [0, 6), [6, 8), [8, 10), [10, 12), [12, 15), [15,∞).
and the second weak-only Markov structure comes from Example 5.2 with
(
ΛDu , u ≥ 0
)
of the form
ΛDu =

(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(0,0) −λ1u 0 0 λ
1
u
(0,1) 0 0 0 0
(1,0) 0 0 0 0
(1,1) 0 0 0 0
. (5.14)
Both Markov structures (5.13) and (5.14) are the solutions of
Λiu = Θ
i
uΛ
D
u Φ
i, u ≥ 0, i = 1, 2,
with Λ1u = Λ
2
u.
The parameters are listed in Table 7 on page 36. In Figure 14 on page 36, we observe that
the XD with extreme contagious structure produces higher values in systemic instability measure
in both scenarios. This result is consistent with financial intuitions. If two financial institutions
only default simultaneously, as we are measuring the event of Armageddon, this financial system
is certainly more unstable than allowing any financial institution to default individually. Because
the financial system allowing single default will be relatively away from Armageddon. Moreover,
the system beginning with bad condition, i.e. scenario 2, generally behaves more unstable.
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Table 7: Parameters for Example 5.5 (Two Weak-only Markov Structures)
Parameters
Time Periods
[0, 6) [6, 10) [10, 20) [20, 26) [26, 30) [30,∞)
a = b 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Scenario 1: cu 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.09
Scenario 2: cu 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02
0 6 10 20 26 30
Time
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Sy
st
em
ic 
In
st
ab
ilit
y 
M
ea
su
re
cu in scenario 1
extreme contagion
(a) Scenario 1
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Figure 14: Systemic Instability Measure for Example 5.5 (Two Weak-only Markov Structures)
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A Technical Results
In this section, we borrow condition (M) from [BJN13] and collect relevant results from [Cha17] to
lay the basis for our work. Recall the setting in Section 2, let X =
(
X1, . . . ,Xm
)
be a multivariate
Markov chain and take values in E = E1 × · · · × Em. First, we state several conditions.
Condition (M). We say the generator matrix function Λt satisfies condition (M) if Λt satisfies
for every t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
(Mi)
∑
y∈H(yi)
λ
x,y
t =
∑
y∈H(yi)
λ
xˆ,y
t , x
j, xˆj , yj ∈ Ej , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, x, xˆ ∈ H
(
xi
)
, xi 6= yi.
Specifically,
x =
(
x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xm
)
, xˆ =
(
xˆ1, . . . , xi, . . . , xˆm
)
, y =
(
y1, . . . , yi, . . . , ym
)
.
Condition (P). We say the transition probability function Pt,s satisfies condition (P) if for any
0 ≤ t ≤ s <∞, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, we have
(Pi)
∑
y∈H(yi)
Px,yt,s =
∑
y∈H(yi)
Pxˆ,yt,s , x
j , xˆj , yj ∈ Ej , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, x, xˆ ∈ H
(
xi
)
, xi 6= yi.
It was proved in [Cha17, Proposition A.2] that condition (P) is equivalent to condition (M).
Theorem A.1. Assume that
P (Xt = z) > 0, dt -a. e., z ∈ E. (A.1)
Then strong Markovian consistency implies condition (M).
We denote by Πt the collection of all finite partitions of interval [0, t], namely,
Πt = {pit = {0, t1, . . . , tn−1, t} | 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = t, n ∈ N} .
We denote by Eni the n-fold Cartesian product of Ei. Let ψ(a) be a vector in E
n+1
i with the last
element in a. Moreover, Υi denotes the projection operator acting on the initial distribution,(
ΥiµX
)
(Γ) = P
(
Xi0 ∈ Γ
i
)
, Γ ⊂ E, Γi ⊂ Ei.
Theorem A.2. The component Xi of X is a Markov chain in its natural filtration if and only if
for 0 ≤ t ≤ s, any xit, x
i
s ∈ Ei, ψ(x
i
t) ∈ E
n+1
i , any pit ∈ Πt, the following holds,∑
xt∈H(xit)
Ξi
(
t, xt, ψ(x
i
t), pit, µ
X
)
P
xt,x
i
s
t,s = 0, (A.2)
where
Ξi
(
t, xt, ψ(x
i
t), pit, µ
X
)
:= P
(
Xt = xt | X
i
t = x
i
t, X
i
tn−1
= xin−1, . . . , X
i
0 = x
i
0
)
− P
(
Xt = xt | X
i
t = x
i
t
)
P
xt,x
i
s
t,s := P
(
Xis = x
i
s | Xt = xt
)
.
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We state the condition (Ci).
Condition (Ci). Given µX > 0, for any t ≥ 0, xit ∈ Ei, xt ∈ H
(
xit
)
, ψ(xit) ∈ E
n+1
i , and
pit ∈ Πt,
Ξi
(
t, xt, ψ(x
i
t), pit, µ
X
)
= 0.
Theorem A.3. Assume that a multivariate Markov chain X =
(
X1, . . . ,Xm
)
has infinitesimal
generator (Λu, u ≥ 0) with transition semigroup (Pt,s, 0 ≤ t ≤ s). If there exists an initial distribu-
tion µX > 0 such that the transition semigroup P̂it,s of
(
ΘiuΛuΦ
i, u ≥ 0
)
satisfies the identity
ΘitPt,s = P̂
i
t,sΘ
i
s, 0 ≤ t ≤ s, (A.3)
then
(i) Pit,s = P̂
i
t,s, where P
i
t,s is the semigroup of X
i;
(ii) condition (Ci) holds true.
Corollary A.4. If the assumptions in Theorem A.3 hold true, then the component Xi of X is
Markov in its natural filtration with the initial distribution ΥiµX . Moreover, Xi has the generator(
ΘitΛtΦ
i, t ≥ 0
)
.
We conclude this section by presenting the conditions for X to be weak-only Markovian consis-
tent with respect to the component Xi.
Theorem A.5. Suppose that X is a multivariate Markov chain generated by (Λt, t ≥ 0) with initial
distribution µX > 0. If the following conditions are satisfied,
(i) for any 0 ≤ t ≤ s, xit, x
i
s ∈ Ei, ψ
(
xit
)
∈ En+1i , and pit ∈ Πt, Equation (A.2) holds true;
(ii) the inequality holds,
P (Xt = x) > 0, dt -a. e., x ∈ E;
(iii) condition (Mi) (or equivalently, condition (Pi)) does not hold,
then the component Xi of X is a Markov chain in its natural filtration, but not a Markov chain
in the filtration of X. Necessarily, the initial distribution of Xi is ΥiµX and the generator of Xi
coincides with
(
ΘitΛtΦ
i, t ≥ 0
)
.
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